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Up In Arms! 
The Struggle to Preserve the Legacy  
of the National Park Service During Wartime
jadelyn j. moniz nakamura 
In 1916 Congress established the National Park Service (NPS) to 
“conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the 
wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations.”1 Never has it been more of a chal-
lenge for the NPS to balance this dual mandate of conservation and 
recreation than during World War II. National Parks are created to 
protect and preserve natural and cultural resources for future genera-
tions. In the years leading up to and during the war the Park Service 
was seriously challenged because of the overriding concern for the 
defense of the nation. Across the country, national parks and other 
federal lands were used to support the nation’s overall war effort; 
their land and the resources on them were considered convenient 
and expendable. Numerous conflicts arose between the parks and 
the military over access and use.2 The National Park Service, its mis-
sion, and culture, were in essence under an internal attack, and parks 
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found it necessary to defend strenuously their values and resources 
while delicately balancing the demands of a nation at war.
Like many national parks across the country, Hawaii National Park 
was used as an Army headquarters, a rest and rehabilitation center, a 
bombing range, a training and maneuver area, a camp for Japanese 
internees and Korean and Okinawan prisoners of war, and as grazing 
land. This article discusses the often challenging role the National 
Park Service played in the defense of the nation during World War 
II at the Kīlauea section of what was then called Hawaii National 
Park. This article begins with a brief history of military involvement at 
Kīlauea before the establishment of the park, delves into the role the 
park played in preparing for hostilities in the years leading up to the 
war, and finally, discusses the enormous responsibility placed on the 
park and staff to balance management of its resources while support-
ing the troops during and immediately after hostilities.
Early History of Military Involvement at Kīlauea
Hawaii National Park was established in 1916. When it was  created, 
the park encompassed the lands of Mauna Loa, Kīlauea and Halea­
kalā—three of the most important places on the islands of Hawai‘i 
and Maui (Figure 1). In 1960 the park was split into two units, and in 
1961 they were designated Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park, on the 
island of Hawai‘i, and Haleakalā National Park on the island of Maui. 
These park lands were set aside by the United States government to 
provide for their protection and for the “benefit and enjoyment of the 
people.”3 Here, park visitors are amazed by the geological wonders, 
awed by the natural beauty, and inspired by the rich cultural heritage. 
Among the millions of visitors who have come to Kīlauea and 
Mauna Loa, those with ties to the U.S. military have left a lasting 
imprint on the land (Figure 2 and 3). The early history of the mili-
tary and Hawaii National Park was generally one of mutual benefit. 
Military personnel came to the park as scientists and visitors, and they 
also helped to build the infrastructure. One of the first documented 
military projects within park land dates to December 1840, when 
for five days Navy Lieutenant Charles Wilkes and crew from the U.S. 
Exploring Expedition ascended Mauna Loa to measure its height and 
establish a station at Pendulum Peak.4 Seventy-five years after Wilkes, 
the Buffalo Soldiers, an African American military unit, arrived in the 
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park to help build a critical trail connecting the summit of Kīlauea 
to the summit of Mauna Loa. While at Kīlauea, the men visited the 
volcano and enjoyed the beauty of the area. 
Hawaii National Park and its volcanoes were a popular destination 
for both enlisted men and officers stationed in Hawai‘i who came to 
view spectacular volcanic eruptions (Figure 4). Interest in Kīlauea as a 
training and rest area began in September 1911, when Companies A 
and F, Twentieth Infantry, arrived. They were followed two years later 
by one hundred men from Company D, First Infantry, who camped 
near the Volcano House.5 Recognizing the benefit that military tour-
ists could provide to local businesses, Lorrin Thurston, a politician 
and businessman, tried to encourage more military visitation through 
the establishment of a recreational camp and maneuver ground at 
Kīlauea for soldiers and sailors. By the fall of 1916 the Kīlauea Military 
Camp (KMC) was up and running within the boundaries of Hawaii 
National Park. The establishment of KMC has resulted in the most 
long-standing and visible representation of the military in the park. It 
has been an important place for soldiers and their families to go for 
Figure 1. Location of Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park. 
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rest and relaxation, an oasis from the stresses and conflict of war. KMC 
would play a prominent role during World War II; its establishment, 
along with other pre-war projects and programs, would help set the 
stage for direct military involvement in the park.
While KMC is the most visible military presence in the park, the 
military had other lasting impacts that forever altered the natural and 
cultural landscape. Many of these early changes, which occurred prior 
to World War II, were welcomed by the young park in its efforts to 
build its infrastructure. In 1923 General Charles P. Summerall, who 
commanded the Hawaiian Department, requested an airfield be con-
structed on Hawai‘i island. Thomas Boles, who was then park super-
intendent, suggested and approved construction of the Kīlauea Land-
ing Field to the south of Halema‘uma‘u crater (Figure 5). The next 
year the airfield was damaged by an eruptive event, and the military 
requested a second airfield be constructed. In 1925 Boles Field was 
approved and built closer to KMC so it could be readily used by mili-
tary personnel stationed there. 
Figure 2. Map of Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park with places mentioned in text 
noted.
up in arms!   183
Other welcome additions to the park were carried out by the 
men of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a quasi-military out-
fit established by the United States government during the Great 
Depression. Known as the “Tree Army,” the CCC provided jobs for the 
unemployed primarily in conservation programs on public lands. The 
CCC established a large camp at Kīlauea, where it built or reinforced 
much of the park’s existing infrastructure, including buildings, roads, 
trails, and water systems. Many of these facilities are still used by visi-
tors and park staff.
Prewar Military Buildup
By 1939 most of the world was engulfed in war, but the United States 
had stayed out. Despite America’s neutrality there was tension, espe-
cially with Japan. Government leaders knew that sooner or later the 
U.S. would be involved in the war in some capacity, and the military 
and other federal agencies began to focus on national security. In 
Figure 3. Map of Kīlauea Caldera with places mentioned in text noted.
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1940, a survey of Park Service programs was undertaken to identify 
the best role for the agency to play in the nation’s defense. The study, 
completed by the Bureau of the Budget and congressional commit-
tees, concluded that the Park Service was best suited to impart “the 
fundamental principles of American democracy” and prepare the 
“national mind to defend democracy.” This meant boosting morale 
and inspiring the citizenship for the “love of country.”6 Despite this 
assessment, the military viewed Park Service land in a different light. 
As the buildup to war increased and national defense became a prior-
ity, parks were viewed as good places to establish new training areas 
and defensive sites, and the resources within park lands were consid-
ered to be available and exploitable. 
Because of the atmosphere of impending war, and the desire to 
support America’s security policy, Park Service leaders, including 
then-superintendent of Hawaii National Park Edward Wingate, tried 
to balance the desires (sometimes demands) of the military with their 
mission to preserve park resources. This would become a common 
Figure 4. Sailors at Kīlauea, post­1924 explosive eruption (note “14 Ton” sign). Photo 
National Park Service, Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park, Historic Photo Collection, 
Accession HAVO-554.
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approach for Park Service leaders as they sought to defend the ide-
als and principles of the agency. They argued that the values of the 
Service and its mission were essential for the morale of the country 
and that these areas must be preserved for the future when the war 
was won.7 
Edward Wingate was well suited to guide Hawaii National Park 
through this turbulent time. He knew the park, its adjacent lands, 
and the local community well. Wingate was appointed superintendent 
of Hawaii National Park on November 16, 1933, and held that post 
for 13 years. Born in North Carolina, he came to Hawai‘i at the age 
of 23 and worked as a topographical engineer for the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) in the uplands of Kahuku, the S.E. flank of 
Mauna Loa, the forests of Kīlauea, and in Kapa‘ahu region of Puna. 
Wingate also worked on the east and southeast side of Maui as well as 
in Kaupō. As superintendent he strongly defended the Park Service 
mission as he tried to buffer the effects of military incursion and the 
loss of staff and resources. 
Figure 5. Kīlauea Landing Field, 1923. Photo Wriston Aerial Collection, 74-30-4, 
Plate 19, Lyman Museum.
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Military impacts started even before the United State entered the 
war, when a number of bills were introduced in Congress to transfer 
land from the NPS to the War Department.8 Hawaii National Park did 
not escape this trend. In 1938, the Army Air Corps needed an air-
plane bombing range for training. The Corps decided that the Ka‘ū 
coast of Hawaii National Park met training needs and was the most 
suitable place to establish the range.9 The area under consideration, 
which was to be called the Nāpu‘uonā‘elemākule Bombing Range, 
had been added to the park only ten years earlier (Figure 6). If the 
training range was established in the park, the public would no longer 
be able to access and use the land because the dangers associated with 
bombing and unexploded ordnance would be too risky. 
Wingate was forced to walk a delicate balance, not wanting to 
object forcefully to the military’s plans to defend the nation, yet 
required to uphold the mission of the National Park Service and pre-
serve the integrity of the land. Wingate tried to negotiate the best deal 
for the park in regard to the withdrawal of the ‘Elemākule lands. He 
requested that no permanent structures be built in the area and that 
the Army make every effort to locate another site for the bombing 
range.10 In a meeting in November 1938, the Army stated that Ka‘ū 
was the only suitable location for the new bombing range, and Wing-
ate agreed to the use of the land.11 Two years later, in March 1940, the 
Army applied for the use of 6,450 acres in the park. This was consid-
Figure 6. Nāpu‘uonā‘elemākule Bombing Range, 1938. Photo Stearns Collection, 
Edwin H. Mookini Library, University of Hawai‘i at Hilo.
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erably more land than was first requested. Protests were filed by local 
groups as well as the superintendent’s office. Wingate made one last 
attempt to lessen the impact and secure the best deal for the National 
Park Service. He made several more requests: (1) that the Army use 
no more than six square miles of park land; (2) that the land be 
removed from the park only after the Army had considered all other 
suitable places; (3) that the Army give good reason for wanting the 
Ka‘ū piece; and (4) the Ka‘ū land be swapped for land in Kalapana.12
Public reaction to the removal of the Ka‘ū lands reflected Wing-
ate’s stance. Across the nation, many individuals and conservation 
groups were against the removal of park land and voiced their objec-
tion. In 1940 Richard W. Westwood wrote to the magazine Nature in 
defense of keeping the Ka‘ū lands in the park: 
With all the terrific destruction going on in the world today, the still 
small voice of conservation is going to have a more and more difficult 
time making itself heard.13
The Audubon Society, the Isaak Walton League, and other conserva-
tion groups protested the bill as well. They all felt that even if the 
nation was close to war, removal of park land for military purposes 
would set a dangerous precedent. The overall mood, however, was 
one of reluctant resignation. Many felt that protection of the park’s 
lands was beyond their control and that the government’s priority was 
national security and defense, not preservation.14 
On May 23, 1940, the Isaak Walton League wrote to the Secretary 
of the Interior:
While in principal [sic], of course, we are opposed to any withdrawal 
from national parks, we hesitate to oppose this particular bill as we do 
not want to be in the position of opposing any needed national defense 
measures.15 
In the spring of 1940, over moderate protests, Senator J. Morris Shep-
pard introduced a bill requesting nine square miles (5,760 acres) 
plus a number of park roads, trails, and the Hilina Pali be removed 
from Hawaii National Park for use by the Army. On July 16, 1940, 
withdrawal of the area went into effect after revisions to the origi-
nal bill. In its final form, bills H.R. 9171 and S. 3676 decreased the 
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area of withdrawal to just over four and a half square miles (2,880 
acres). In addition, the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, General Charles Herron, agreed that if the Army did not use, 
or abandoned the area, the land would revert to its previous owner 
(the National Park Service).16
Two years after the ‘Elemākule Range request, on July 18, 1940, 
the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department again looked 
at land within the park for additional training. He requested a survey 
of park land near the Mauna Loa truck trail “for [the] eventual use 
of the Mauna Loa site for road construction and erection of certain 
unspecified defense works.” Although Wingate approved the surveys 
on July 20, 1940, it is not clear what became of the project, and park 
records show no further discussion.17 
Preparing Personnel
By 1940 the prospect of the United States being drawn into the global 
conflict was increasing and the involvement of Hawaii National Park 
in the prewar preparations went far beyond the establishment of the 
‘Elemākule Range. Park staff began to prepare for war and partici-
pated in a number of territory-wide blackout exercises. The first exer-
cise occurred at 8:30 p.m. on May 23, 1940. The second took place 
nearly a year later on May 20, 1941, and the final exercise between 
8:02 and 8:22 p.m. on August 24, 1941, less than four months before 
Pearl Harbor was attacked.18 
In addition to blackout exercises, park staff and the neighboring 
community began to organize themselves. In 1940 park rangers and 
men from the “general vicinity” of the park formed a group called 
the Volcano District Emergency Police Guard, which was made up 
of about eighty members of the park, CCC, hotel staff, and neigh-
boring farmers and laborers. Members of this group participated in 
target practice and trained with the Red Cross in first aid (Figure 7). 
They also salvaged scrap aluminum and copper from local dumps. 
At the park, staff members cross-trained in other divisions to prevent 
personnel shortages during emergencies.19 A second group called 
the Superintendent’s Advisory Committee on National Defense was 
formed. This group had formerly been called the Committee on Food 
Production, but its name changed when its duties were broadened 
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to cover “review and recommendation” on national defense issues 
that related to the park or the nearby community.20 One goal of both 
groups was to identify ways to extend the service of the park to Army 
units stationed on Hawai‘i island. Part of this service was to be pre-
pared for any emergency. At 10:00 p.m. on November 29, 1941, just a 
week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the superintendent decided 
to put all of their training to the test. He called a surprise alert of the 
Police Guard, and 100 percent of the staff participated in eight hours 
of guard and patrol duty in the cold rain. Others who reported for 
duty included the CCC staff, hotel personnel, and civilian residents 
within a three-mile radius of the park.21
In addition to the active defensive training, a number of other 
small but important activities were being undertaken in preparation 
for war. The park women knitted clothes for the Red Cross, and park 
staff was ordered to reduce the purchase of aluminum and copper 
items. The park also created small vegetable gardens at individual 
quarters as well as a larger community garden for park employees, 
and they began ordering and stockpiling cases of staple food supplies 
for emergency use.22 
Figure 7. Hawaii National Park, Small Arms Firing Range in the 1930s. Photo Kīlauea 
Military Camp.
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“There Could Be No Doubt” 
A week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the information park staff 
received over the radio had not been reassuring, and it looked like 
the country was edging closer to war. Although the park had been 
through extensive training, nothing could fully prepare them for the 
upheaval, challenges, and changes soon to be brought by war. Like 
many in the islands on December 7, 1941, Superintendent Wingate 
first heard news of the attack on the morning radio. Wanting to con-
firm what he was hearing, Wingate phoned several people, including 
Park Ranger Charles W. Miller, who was on switchboard duty that day. 
No one at the park could confirm the attack. Wingate then called 
the Hilo police, who were on standby, but had no other informa-
tion for the park. Wingate decided to put his staff on standby as well, 
because he was not sure that what he was hearing on the radio was 
accurate. His uncertainties continued until the announcer stated that 
“the Rising Sun had been seen on the wings of the attacking planes. 
There could be no doubt then.”23 The park finally received official 
word of the attack when the Federal Communications Commission 
office called and confirmed it. Wingate immediately went over to the 
“Army Recreation Camp (KMC) and conferred with Colonel Bonham 
who was in charge there.”24 The Emergency Police Guard “assumed 
duty stations as rapidly as arms and identification arm bands—rushed 
through by the park women could be issued.”25 It was now their job to 
prevent vital facilities from being sabotaged.26 
The attack on Pearl Harbor marked the start of the war for Amer-
ica and a radical change in everyday life, especially for those living 
in Hawai‘i. Superintendent Wingate was about to enter a very chal-
lenging period of his tenure, including the eventual loss of the CCC 
staff, drastic cuts in regular park staff and funding, damage to park 
resources, and a virtual takeover of park facilities and resources by the 
military under the order of martial law. 
Martial Law Goes Into Effect 
At 11:30 a.m., a mere three-and-a-half hours after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, territorial governor Joseph B. Poindexter invoked the 
Hawaii Defense Act. At 3:30 p.m. Lieutenant General Walter C. Short 
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declared himself military governor of Hawai‘i and martial law went 
into effect for the islands.27 The military command would begin to 
rely heavily on the infrastructure, staff, and equipment in the national 
parks to help defend the homeland. All key park personnel were 
placed on twenty-four-hour duty while others were assigned to work 
eight-hour shifts daily. Nightly blackout rules immediately went into 
effect and all cars and trucks that did not have a military pass were 
ordered off the road both day and night. Schools were closed, alcohol 
was prohibited, and no one was allowed to travel between 6:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 a.m. Bicycles became more common, and home gardens 
were started.28 
The staff at Hawaii National Park cooperated fully with the Army 
and the county police department after the initial outbreak of war. 
Nine days after the attack, Superintendent Wingate was appointed 
deputy sheriff for the island of Hawai‘i, and other staff members 
and park volunteers were commissioned as special deputies for the 
Puna and Ka‘ū districts. The superintendent was also appointed to 
represent the provost marshal and was given the responsibility of issu-
ing military passes, gasoline and kerosene permits, and permits for 
alien travel for the park and the Twenty-nine Mile ( just outside of 
the park) and Glenwood areas.29 In the immediate days following the 
attack, armed park rangers were busy checking on reports of strange 
lights, behavior, and noises, while armed volunteers from the park 
and  Volcano area guarded intersections, roads, and public utilities. 
The park women were not to be outdone by the men. They knitted 
fifty-eight sweaters, four scarves, one shawl and twenty pairs of socks 
by the end of 1941—less than a month!30 As the war progressed, the 
park women took over tasks the men had been assigned, including 
jobs at the warehouses, making bandages, and issuing and delivery of 
firewood and kerosene so the men could perform other duties.31 
Defending the Homeland
From the moment Pearl Harbor was attacked until late spring, when 
the defenses of the island were strengthened, the focus of the park 
staff was to assist the Army.32 All personnel and facilities were drawn 
into the war effort. Despite their conflicting mandates, the NPS staff 
felt that they went above and beyond to help facilitate the Army in 
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every way possible. The Army was committed to fighting the war, and 
although it tried to respect the Park Service’s preservation mandate, 
martial law and the immense need for training took priority. Park 
operations were set aside, and in the first year of the war the staff 
devoted almost its entire time to aiding the Army and defending the 
home front. In the months and years ahead, many conflicts arose 
between the two agencies, whose missions and operations were funda-
mentally different. 
Less than a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army was 
having an immense impact on the park’s landscape and operations. 
With a ready infrastructure available, the Army took over much of the 
park for training and used its buildings to house staff. Superintendent 
Wingate had very good relations with Major General Ralph Pennel, 
who assumed command of the District of Hawaii. When General Pen-
nel needed a headquarters and command post, the superintendent 
ordered a rush to complete construction of the Volcano Observatory 
and Naturalist building (currently serving as the park headquarters 
and visitor center). The job, which had been 60 percent complete, 
was finished four days later on March 4, 1942 by the CCC (20 enroll-
ees), park staff (three men), and semi-skilled labor from the U.S. 
Engineers (16 men).33 Other park structures, facilities, equipment, 
and land were used by the Army, including the historic 1877 Volcano 
House, which was rented from the concessioner and used as officer 
and staff quarters (see Table 1). 
In addition to park buildings and equipment, the military relied 
on park staff to help prepare the island’s defense. Staff guarded the 
park entrances, and law enforcement rangers were tasked to teach 
the Emergency Police Guard proper handling and shooting of fire-
arms, using donated guns and ammunition.34 A few days after the 
attack, the job of the Emergency Police Guard turned to maintaining 
and building the defensive infrastructure within the park. The Guard 
super vised construction projects, enforced the nightly blackouts, and 
set up defensive sites that consisted of sand containers placed at the 
front and rear of homes and buildings. If there was an air raid, the 
sand would be used to fight incendiary bomb fires. The Guard also 
assigned two park staff to man three seacoast observation posts at stra-
tegic points (Hilina Pali, Pānau, and Poliokeawe Pali) and a fourth at 
Uwēkahuna Museum. The observation posts were equipped with map-
Table 1. Selected List of Army Requests Approved by the NPS.44
 Request Date Approved
Surveys for proposed installations, road improvements, and  July 20, 1940
extensions on Mauna Loa
Use of Uwēkahuna Museum as observation post March 17, 1942
Use of brand new Volcano Observatory and Naturalist Building  March 19, 1942
for offices
Use of Quarters #27-1 for officers residence April 1, 1942
Reopen 6,418 acres to cattle grazing June 3, 1942
Use of parcel of land at ‘Āpua for defense installation July 9, 1942
Use of 1 acre of land at end of Chain of Craters Road for defense  July 14, 1942
installation (Crater Billets)
Use of house to station small detachment of men August 15, 1942
Use of house to station small detachment of men October 12, 1942
Use of part of a building to operate radio equipment April 1942
Use of CCC camp to quarter troops and construction of  May 13, 1942
additional temporary buildings
Use of parcel of land for storage supplies June 5, 1942
Train six mules for transport of food, water, and staff to  December 1943
remote locations
Operated five observation posts, shore patrol along 25 miles  1941–1942
of shore line, guarded utilities and water supply, patrolled roads  
within and outside park
Plough several thousand acres of flat land and parking areas to  1942
render them useless to the enemy in accordance with a request 
from military governor
Established Ka‘ū Desert Impact and Training Area 1943
Use of tools, maps, plans, reports; carpenter, paint, and machine  Throughout war 
shops for emergency work and routine repairs for units stationed  
in vicinity
Loan of two dump trucks, a pickup truck, a tractor and a grader,  Throughout war 
typewriter, Dictaphone, and other office equipment
Take several hundred tons of gravel with much more taken  Throughout war 
without permission
Talks given by park naturalist at various Army posts on the island  Throughout war 
showing movies of the park and volcanoes. 
Made water supply available Throughout war
Participation of staff in purchasing war bonds (100 percent  Unknown
participation and 12.5 percent payroll deduction) and turned 
in 5,980 pounds of scrap rubber (50 lbs per person).
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ping instruments, maps, and a forty-power telescope. Those assigned 
to the observation posts were tasked to locate planes or ships at sea, 
determine their bearings, and transmit that information to the Army. 
Park staff traveled on horseback to these remote sites where they 
erected simple shelters and camping facilities. Staff also “frequently 
patrolled” the seacoasts to the south and east.”35 Outside of the park, 
the Emergency Police Guard worked as far as Glenwood where they 
assisted with establishing “First Aid Casualty Stations, air raid shelters, 
fire protection brigades and instructing personnel and residents” in 
these activities.36 
The CCC was integral to the development of the park, and espe-
cially important in the opening months of World War II. It completed 
many of the emergency projects that were needed by the military to 
establish its presence at Kīlauea, including construction of six­and­
a-half miles of telephone line from the observation post at Maka-
opuhi to the one at Pānau, and a mile­and­half of telephone line 
from ‘Āinahou Ranch House to the observation post at Poliokeawe 
Pali. Other changes to the telephone system were made so that there 
would be instant communication with guard stations. The CCC also 
spent considerable time in February 1942 constructing underground 
air raid shelters throughout the park headquarters area.37 The enroll-
ees also took national defense vocational training classes in welding, 
carpentry and auto mechanics to help establish a ready workforce.38 
Despite their contribution to the park and the war effort, the federal 
government disbanded the program at the end of fiscal year 1942. 
In the early months of the war, the military requested use of several 
parcels of park land and buildings (Table 1). The military encroached 
upon many other areas in the park and used equipment and supplies 
without the agreement of the NPS. These included the use of motor 
vehicles, breaking of fences in Kīpukapuaulu, widening of several 
miles of trail into a truck trail through the forest, the erection of small 
buildings near Hilina Pali shelter, and the use of crushed rock and 
firewood without permission, to mention just a few.39 
Not long after the initial attack and declaration of war, life in the 
park took on an established routine. Some duties were dropped alto-
gether, but as many park tasks as possible were resumed after military 
assignments were completed. The Observatory staff was also impacted 
with key staff being pulled for war duty. This left the volcanologist 
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able to complete only routine tasks and seismograph measurements; 
much of his time was taken up with police guard duties.40 By the 
end of the fiscal year, a skeleton crew was left to carry on only essen-
tial park duties, including protection, maintenance and research.41 
Despite this, the superintendent commented that not only was the 
park functioning better than other organizations on the island, but it 
was also better prepared because park personnel had “generally tried 
to foresee and prepare for what might come.”42 The park’s goal was 
to do everything possible to prevent an attack on its facilities. Assis-
tant Chief Ranger Gunder Olson remarked in January 1942 that the 
“work subsequent to December 7 has been toward preventing Hawaii 
National Park from becoming a possible Hawaii National Battlefield 
Park.”43 
From R&R to Internment Camp
KMC served as both a training facility for the National Guard of 
Hawaii and recreational facility for Army and Navy personnel in the 
years preceding World War II. In 1941 it became an important stag-
ing ground for the war. From March to October 1942, KMC became 
the headquarters for the Twenty-seventh Division of the Army. The 
troops used the buildings at KMC for quarters and the grounds for 
training. During the first five months of the war, KMC also served as 
a temporary facility for the internment of local Japanese Americans 
(Figure 8). 
Prior to the outbreak of war, the FBI had developed a custodial 
detention list. On the day Pearl Harbor was attacked, the War Depart-
ment, working under the authority of martial law, ordered that every-
one on the list be interned.45 The FBI and Army Intelligence imme-
diately began to arrest Japanese on Hawai‘i island who had been 
identified as “enemy aliens.” These individuals were detained at KMC, 
which was transformed overnight from an R&R facility to a prison. 
The first detainees arrived at KMC in the afternoon of December 7, 
1941. They did not stay at KMC for long, however, because under 
international law interned aliens could not be held in a combat zone 
and had to be taken to a place where hostilities were unlikely.46 The 
first group of 106 detainees transferred from KMC to Sand Island, 
O‘ahu, on March 6, 1942. The last group of twenty-five detainees was 
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transferred on May 12, 1942. While at KMC, detainees were confined 
to their barracks and were only allowed to march to the adjacent cafe-
teria for meals.47 While at KMC they were surrounded by guard towers 
and machine gun positions that had been erected after the attack.48
Local Japanese farmers and concessioners who had worked for the 
park were also affected. One Japanese concessioner who had been 
operating a photographic business in the park prior to the war had 
his contract cancelled on December 31, 1941. He was interned by the 
authorities and found to have failed to “comply with several orders 
of the military governor and to have violated certain park regula-
tions.”49 Many others, however, quietly continued to support their 
government. Superintendent Wingate wrote that fifteen Japanese 
truck farmers from the Twenty-nine Mile area had “faithfully [served] 
without murmur through long days and nights of rain and cold, know-
ing that there is slight possibility of paying them for their faithful and 
diligent services.”50 
In June 1942 the Battle of Midway changed the tide of the war, 
and KMC was again re-activated as a rest and recreation camp, but 
it also continued to support tactical training of troops. In October 
1943 the decision to return the facility to a fully recreational one 
Figure 8. U.S. Army Signal Corps Formation, 1940s. Building 34 in background was 
used to intern Japanese Americans. Photo Kīlauea Military Camp.
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was made, and priority was given to troops who had seen combat.51 
In June 1944, an addition to KMC was built on the west side, in the 
area that is now the motor pool. These facilities would serve as a 
prisoner of war (POW) camp for Koreans and Okinawans who had 
been brought to the United States from islands captured from the 
Japanese. The POW camp was established without the permission 
of Superintendent Wingate while he was away on business.52 At the 
camp, the POWs  performed maintenance and upkeep.53 At the end 
of the war, about 80 to 140 prisoners remained and continued to 
work. The last of the group returned to their country of origin on 
December 5, 1946.54
“A Spectacular but Ill-Timed Event”
With the initial war effort on Hawai‘i Island centered at the park, and 
an internment camp springing up overnight, park staff had a lot to 
deal with. They did not need another monumental event—but that is 
exactly what they got. Four months after Pearl Harbor was attacked, 
Mauna Loa began erupting on April 26, 1942 (Figure 9). The erup-
Figure 9. Mauna Loa Eruption, 1942. Photo National Park Service, Hawai‘i Volcanoes 
National Park, Historic Photo Collection, Accession HAVO-554.
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tion first began at the summit crater Moku‘āweoweo and then broke 
out on the northeast rift. The eruption was not unexpected, but in 
the superintendent’s opinion, though “spectacular” it was “ill-timed.” 
Martial law resulted in nightly blackouts, but the glow from Pele illu-
minated the sky. The military government feared the Japanese would 
use the light from the eruption as a beacon to guide their warplanes 
under the cover of darkness for another attack on Hawai‘i. They 
declared the eruption a “secret” and did not allow the news media to 
cover it. Two days after the eruption began, Tokyo Rose broadcast a 
message congratulating the islands on its spectacular volcanic display, 
showing the futility of the efforts to control such information. As the 
flow headed toward Hilo, it threatened to cut off Saddle Road. This 
would have had serious impacts on the war effort. The decision was 
made to have the Army bomb the flow, as it had in 1935 in an effort 
to try to stop its advance. When the eruption did finally stop naturally 
on May 10 (fourteen days after it began), it had come within almost 
seven miles of Upper Waiākea Uka.55 
Tourism
The new Volcano House opened in November 1941 and was immedi-
ately popular with the public. Just one month later, war broke out and 
the hotel went from being crowded to almost empty. Seven months 
after the war began there was “little or no business,” and almost the 
only guests were Army personnel who were there for meals and “club-
room refreshments.”56 Civilian travel to and from Hawai’i and the 
mainland was restricted and the cause of many empty rooms. While 
these restrictions and a lack of other recreational activities and accom-
modations on the island encouraged some visits by locals, overall very 
few people were coming to the park for recreation. In the first week 
of December 1941 there were 50,000 visitors to the Kīlauea section 
of the park. In the month and a half after the attack non-military visi-
tors to the park “declined to almost nothing.”57 In fiscal year 1941, 
there were 306,881 visitors—103,804 of them military personnel. In 
fiscal year 1942 visitation totaled 386,680—226,256 of them military. 
Although civilian travel resumed in July 1942, it took three years for 
the Volcano House to again be filled to capacity.58 
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Mission Conflicts
The challenges for Hawaii National Park and its staff went far beyond 
dealing with issues of internees and prisoners of war, dropping visitor 
counts, and an untimely eruption. As the war dragged on, mission 
conflicts arose and soon the park was struggling to maintain its core 
values and protect its resources. The initial months of the war saw a 
surge in military use of the park. For the most part, the park was able 
to accommodate the requests by lending out buildings, tools, water 
tanks, a gas station, and animal stock. But even as the Army head-
quarters in the park relocated to Hilo in October 1942, the use of the 
park for training purposes increased. By 1943 the continued impact 
on the park’s natural landscape, its infrastructure, and supplies was 
becoming more than an inconvenience. Numerous complaints from 
the park staff were received by the superintendent, who continuously 
appealed to the Army for restraint. Wingate was balancing a difficult 
role—martial law still existed and there was not much he could legally 
do to keep the military from going where it wanted to go and using 
what it wanted to use. He continued to keep the channels of commu-
nication with the Army open and tried to strike a balance. 
The task that Wingate took on was large. After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, fear of sabotage and invasion was very real in Hawai‘i. This 
fear prompted the park to take actions that under normal conditions 
would be considered drastic in a national park. Hawai‘i was eyed by 
Japan as a launching site for invasion of the mainland United States 
and a number of invasion scenarios had been drawn up. One plan 
designed by the commander of the Second Carrier Division of the 
Japanese Combined Fleet called for the invasion of Hawai‘i island 
first. Japan felt that because the island was sparsely populated and 
weakly defended, it could be “transformed into an aircraft carrier” 
from which further attacks on the islands and eventually the United 
States mainland could occur. Cleared cane fields and old lava flows 
could be turned into airfields that would support Japanese units on 
Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.59 Fear of invasion after Pearl Harbor 
led the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department to order all 
flat areas in the park be made unusable to enemy aircraft “by block-
ing with boulders or plowing, or erecting rails and posts.”60 The areas 
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bulldozed surrounded Kīlauea caldera and included the existing air-
fields and other cultural and natural features. In addition to the bull-
dozing, one lane of the road leading to Halema‘uma‘u crater and 
its parking lot was closed. By 1943 Wingate warned of a possible cra-
ter eruption and bemoaned the “excessive wear and tear . . . through 
use of only one lane and shoulder” that was occurring.61 Citing the 
remote chance that Japan would attack and use this road, he pleaded 
for it to be opened.
The adverse treatment of the landscape did not stop with the dis-
abling of the airfields, roads, and lands around the caldera. During 
the war, Hawai‘i experienced a beef shortage. In response to this 
shortage and in cooperation with the food production program of the 
territory, the secretary of interior authorized the park to re-open land 
to cattle grazing. The park approved a permit for C. Brewer and Com-
pany in 1943 for 6,418 acres of land on the slopes of Mauna Loa at a 
cost of $2,500 per annum. The NPS tried to minimize the impact of 
grazing cattle on park lands by limiting the permit to open “meadow 
lands,” outside of kīpuka [pockets of vegetation] and koa groves. The 
superintendent gave final approval on condition the ranch fence in 
(at its expense) three koa groves.62
Training Areas Expand
The removal of the ‘Elemākule Range land in 1938 was a big pill to 
swallow for the NPS, and it seemed at the time that the military would 
focus all training there. As the war raged on, however, the ‘Elemākule 
Range was not enough. In the first six months of 1944 alone, 25,000 
troops used the Kīlauea area for training.63 The Army desired more 
land for maneuvers and live fire exercises and continued to spread out 
in the park. The park approved the dragging of a portion of Kīlauea 
Landing Field for a landing strip for light artillery fire observation 
planes, and gave permission to use a portion of a temporary road into 
the Ka‘ū desert from a point just south of Keanakāko‘i crater to set 
up a gun emplacement.64 This expansion ultimately led to increasing 
conflicts with park operations and complaints from park staff as the 
Army moved outside of these areas without permission. The military 
set tripwires across patrol and public trails without park knowledge, 
endangering hikers and staff. Army troops also failed to clear boul-
up in arms!   201
ders set up for defensive purposes from roads that were used as evacu-
ation routes during volcanic eruptions.65 Shell craters and fragments 
were found west of the Cone Peaks below Halema‘um‘au; at Sulphur 
Banks an Army truck drove across the lower slopes of the sulphur 
formations north of the gas house, which had been broken into.66 
A spatter cone on Mauna Iki was destroyed.67 On January 9, 1943, 
a company was seen shooting toward the Chain of Craters Road.68 
There were several incidents of bombing and strafing of ‘Āpua Point, 
and soldiers were seen bivouacking and setting up firing points at the 
base of the Mauna Loa road. Park roads, which were never built to 
handle large military vehicles, were being degraded and park tools 
were left unusable. A network of truck trails, tracks, parking areas, 
and bivouac sites had been set up by the military. The park was being 
used extensively by the Army for training, and considerable damage 
was being done to forests and the landscape. The natural and cultural 
resources of the park were being impaired, and Wingate felt that at 
a minimum, cleanup would cost $10,000, but continued use would 
make restoration impossible.69
By 1943, the superintendent wanted the military to leave the park, 
but the Army continued to assert that Kīlauea offered the best terrain 
for combined maneuvers, was within its necessary travel time radius 
from its bases, and by training there they were saving on gas and wear 
and tear on equipment. Wingate disputed this claim and argued 
that there were other suitable areas on the island that could be used 
for training, including the “waste lands west of Kalapana—the 1840 
lava flow and the Puna Forest Reserve” and the “waste lands between 
Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea . . . [and] portions of the Waimea and 
South Kohala tablelands and the plains above South Point.”70
Ka‘ū Desert Impact and Training Area
Wingate’s arguments fell on deaf ears. So, he settled on a plan to 
negotiate with the Army to confine its training to a specific area of 
the park without approval from the Department of Interior. In an 
attempt to contain the increasing spread and destruction of the native 
landscape by the troops, Wingate and the Army agreed to an area 
in the Ka‘ū desert where the Army could train. Known informally as 
the Ka‘ū Desert Impact and Training Area, the Army demarcated a 
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specific area on a map south of Kīlauea caldera where maneuvers 
and troops would be confined in Hawaii National Park. The Depart-
ment of Interior never formally agreed to this site, and it was never 
removed from the National Park Service as the ‘Elemākule Range had 
been.71 Wingate had several conditions for the use of this area: (1) 
the area would be used only if absolutely necessary and use would end 
once that necessity passed (end of hostilities); (2) the Army would 
make every effort to find somewhere else to train; (3) units would 
be instructed to avoid unnecessary damage to vegetation and other 
natural features; and (4) no new access roads or structures would be 
built without the superintendent’s approval. Explicit training assign-
ments were given to ensure safety and compliance by the military. The 
military also provided a memo that instructed personnel training in 
the Impact Area on standard operating procedures (SOP) for its use. 
These SOPs included: (1) weapons could be placed outside of the 
Impact Area only for the purpose of firing into it; (2) the firing posi-
tions were limited to those that were already in use; (3) there would 
be no cutting of vegetation of any kind, and the koa grove was out of 
bounds; (4) latrine screens would be erected and the area would be 
policed; (5) range guards would be posted on all roads and trails lead-
ing to the Impact Area when firing was being conducted; (6) request 
to fire would be submitted to Army headquarters seventy-two hours 
prior to scheduled time; and (7) a schedule for training and firing 
was: Mondays and Tuesdays—infantry engineers; Thursdays and Fri-
days—tank and tank destroyers.72
Despite these seemingly successful negotiations, the military con-
tinued to train outside of the newly assigned area, impacting the 
natural landscape. There were reports of units training one and a 
half miles southwest of Uwēkahuna and other units operating south 
of Kīlauea caldera. The military randomly closed the Chain of Cra-
ters Road to accommodate soldiers firing both machine and thirty-
seven millimeter guns into the Ka‘ū desert.73 Warning signs had 
been set up beyond the Impact Area, and damage to the forest was 
noted, including vehicle tracks, which were observed in the off-limits 
koa grove. Vegetation had been destroyed and cut down for use as 
camouflage, and a number of access roads had been made along 
Halema‘uma‘u even though the agreement with the Army and mem-
oranda explicitly prohibited those actions.74 Wingate complained to 
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military commanders that the Army was using an area twice the size 
agreed upon. 
Withdrawal of Troops
When martial law was lifted on October 24, 1944, Superintendent 
Wingate made a strong case for the removal of troops from the park. 
The military remained, however, and tensions continued between the 
two agencies. The Army used the Impact Area until January 1945, giv-
ing it up only eight months before the war ended in August. The park 
was able to re-open the interpretive trail to Footprints and the area 
was once again accessible to the public.75 Unfortunately, the military 
held on to the ‘Elemākule Bombing Range for ten years, returning 
it to the park only after many requests. ‘Elemākule was never used 
by the Army, but it was used by the Navy—a violation of the original 
agreement. The exercises by the Navy, especially those outside of the 
designated area caused a lot of trouble for the park. One particularly 
dangerous incident occurred on March 25, 1945, when a plane strafed 
four fishermen at ‘Āpua, slightly injuring two of the men. Although 
complaints were made to the Army about the training abuses, the 
Navy was ultimately responsible for the damage. Army commander 
Muller sent a memo to the Navy requesting it stop all noncompliant 
training activities. A halt to such flagrant violations was not enough 
for the Park Service. The NPS requested a complete return of the 
land. In December 1945 the Army relinquished two acres at ‘Āpua 
Point but the ‘Elemākule Range was not returned. In the spring of 
1946 Acting Superintendent Baldwin again resurrected the issue of 
land return. Baldwin pointed out that if the Army was not using it, the 
land should revert to the NPS, not the Navy. He also complained that 
the NPS was routinely denied access to the area to do goat drives, and 
when they were allowed in they were shot at.76 
It took another two years, but finally in April 1948 the Army said it 
had no more objections to removing the ‘Elemākule Range from its 
list of active training sites. The Navy did not share the Army’s senti-
ment and continued to use the range. On September 30, 1948, it 
bombed the site with no prior warning to the park. When the NPS 
asked the Army why the area was being used again, the commanding 
officer at Hickam said the Army was not responsible for this action, 
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but that the Navy had posted a newspaper notice of possible use. Fol-
lowing this incident, General Robert Travis, in a memo dated October 
5, 1948, finally put an end to all military use of the ‘Ele mākule Range. 
Within a year, the Army began clearing the land of unexploded 
 ordnance. In May 1950, the secretaries of war and interior revoked 
the order of withdrawal, and on June 14, 1950, the ‘Elemākule Range 
was officially returned to the Park Service.77 Despite all of the nega-
tive impacts caused by the military in the park, and the tremendous 
effort to get the land back, the Navy submitted a new request in March 
1957 to re­use the Ka‘ū land. It proposed creating a 30,000-acre jet 
bombing range, but was strongly discouraged from this venture, and 
no further requests were made.78 
Aftermath—A Legacy of Impact
Regrettably, the impact of the military on Hawaii National Park as a 
result of World War II did not disappear with the removal of troops 
from its boundaries. Warning signs were kept up for months, and 
many areas were damaged beyond repair. Koa groves had been 
blasted, nēnē nesting sites were gone, and in the desert intensive use 
had broken the fragile crust of volcanic ash beds.79 Feeling the pres-
sure from the Park Service, the Army restored some of the damage 
done outside of the desert area in April 1946. In 1949 and 1950 a 
team from Schofield Barracks on O‘ahu removed unexploded ord-
nance including several 500-pound “general purpose” bombs and 
many other smaller bombs and shells. Some ordnance was found 
near the headquarters area, and a 150 mm Japanese artillery shell was 
found within half a mile of the main crater road. Unfortunately, this 
cleanup did not remove all munitions from the park. Ordnance from 
the World War II era was still being discovered in the Ka‘ū desert well 
into the twenty-first century. 
The impact of the war also went far beyond the affected natural 
and cultural resources. Permanent staff declined from 35 prior to 
December 7, 1941, to 12 in 1945 (Figure 10). Funding for main-
tenance of buildings was non-existent except for emergency repairs, 
and by 1945 these repairs were considered “urgent.” Park road equip-
ment that was “borrowed” by the Army was left unusable, leading the 
park to maintain its roads through hand labor. Both the Mauna Loa 
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truck trail and the Hilina Pali auto trail (both gravel) were not main-
tained at all. It has taken years for the park to recover from the impact 
of the military. How long it will take for the land to heal and for the 
scars to fade remains to be seen. The physical marks of bulldozing 
around the heart of Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park—Kīlauea cal-
dera—still remain, and park staff still battle the legacy left by cattle 
grazing on the slopes of Mauna Loa. It has taken eighty-eight years 
and thousands of man hours for the park to rehabilitate the land that 
was grazed by cattle. The set-back from the war, including a total dis-
bandment of the nursery program from 1941 to 1945, broken fences 
Figure 10. Public contact personnel of the park, July 3, 1940; Front row, left to 
right – Bernard Waltzen; clerk-telephone operator Winifred Tada; Paul Schultz; Geolo-
gist Dr. Thomas Jaggar; Seasonal Ranger Willard Eller; Chisato Fujimoto, Burton 
Loucks, Constance Hewitt, Sadaichi Kawasaki. Back row, left to right – William Elderts, 
John Hauni‘o Sr., Charles Kauhi, Superintendent Edward Wingate, Joseph Christ, 
Arthur Jess, Ralph Shaver, Benjamin Moomaw, Park Naturalist Gunner Fagerlund, 
Ranger Gunder Olson, James Higashida. Photo National Park Service, Hawai‘i Volca-
noes National Park, Historic Photo Collection, Accession HAVO-554.
206   the hawaiian journal of history
and incursion by cattle into protected areas only made the task more 
difficult.80 
Despite these many challenges, Hawaii National Park welcomed 
visitors returning to the park after the war. In time, a sense of nor-
malcy came over the park, and visitors were able to again enjoy the 
freedom the United States had fought so hard for. Park staff returned 
to return to their regular duties of leading walks, giving talks, and 
protecting the resources—able to once again carry out the legislative 
mandate of the National Park Service—to preserve and protect its 
resources for the benefit and enjoyment of future generations.
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